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WHAT MATTERS MORE: A DAY IN JAIL
OR A CRIMINAL CONVICTION?
John P. Gross*
INTRODUCTION
This Article will examine the Supreme Court’s most recent holdings on the right
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment1: Padilla v. Kentucky,2 Missouri v. Frye,3 and
Lafler v. Cooper.4 These cases shed light on the current state of our criminal justice
system, a system where criminal convictions carry with them enmeshed penalties5
which are often of greater concern to defendants than actual incarceration and where
effective representation during plea bargaining is potentially more valuable than effec-
tive representation at trial. Recognizing that there are penalties that result from a con-
viction which are far worse than incarceration and that our criminal justice system
has become essentially a pretrial justice system calls into question the wisdom of the
current rule making the Sixth Amendment right to counsel contingent upon actual
incarceration following conviction.
This Article will trace the Sixth Amendment’s evolution from a right to have
counsel at trial into a right which attaches at any critical stage of the proceedings. It
will analyze the Court’s decision to limit the right to counsel to cases where a defen-
dant is actually incarcerated and argue that this limitation is inconsistent with the
Court’s rationale for requiring the presence of counsel during all critical stages of a
criminal prosecution.
Even assuming that the actual incarceration standard was a good one at the time
it was created forty years ago,6 changes in our criminal justice system have rendered
* Indigent Defense Council, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Adjunct
Associate Professor, American University, Washington College of Law.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, § 3.
2 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
3 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
4 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
5 In Padilla, the Supreme Court described deportation as an “enmeshed” penalty of the
criminal justice system; the argument that deportation was a “collateral consequence” of
conviction was rejected. 130 S. Ct. at 1481–82. Throughout this Article I will use the term
“enmeshed penalty” when referring to those consequences of conviction which have, both
in court decisions and in scholarly journals, previously been termed “collateral consequences.”
6 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that, while the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment unless the state has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense,
a state trial court need not appoint counsel for a criminal defendant charged with a statutory
offense for which imprisonment upon conviction is authorized but not imposed).
55
56 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22:55
it obsolete. Three developments have made the actual incarceration standard an un-
justified limitation on the right to counsel: (1) our criminal justice system’s growing
reliance on plea bargaining; (2) the rise of enmeshed penalties tied to a conviction; and
(3) the widespread availability and dissemination of criminal records.
In order to guarantee the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, courts need
to take into account the potential punishments that result from conviction itself and not
focus solely on whether a defendant will be sentenced to incarceration. Courts must rec-
ognize that there are severe and lasting penalties which occur automatically as a result
of a criminal conviction, even those convictions which never result in the defendant
being incarcerated.
I. THE EXPANSION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER PADILLA, FRYE, AND LAFLER
A. Padilla v. Kentucky
In March of 2010, the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky.7 The Padilla
case involved a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v.
Washington.8 The defendant, a lawful permanent resident of the United States who
pled guilty to drug distribution charges, claimed that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to advise him that his conviction would subject him to deportation.9 The de-
fendant’s claim had been rejected by the Supreme Court of Kentucky on the grounds
that the advice he sought regarding the risks of deportation concerned only collateral
matters.10 Although the precise definition of what constitutes a “collateral,” as opposed
to a “direct,” consequence of a criminal conviction is not entirely clear,11 a collateral
consequence is one which generally refers to a matter outside the sentencing authority
of the court.12 Following this definition, a state trial court would regard any deporta-
tion proceeding initiated in federal court as a collateral consequence of a state court
7 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
8 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the Court found that the question at issue when eval-
uating an ineffectiveness claim is “whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper func-
tioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result.” Id. at 686. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a “defendant must show that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. That
involves demonstrating that counsel’s performance was deficient by showing “that counsel was
not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and “that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687.
9 Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 484–85 (Ky. 2008), rev’d and remanded sub
nom. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
10 See id.
11 See generally Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences,
Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119 (2009) (discussing
the distinction between direct and collateral consequences).
12 See Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Ky. 2005).
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criminal conviction. The Supreme Court of Kentucky found that “collateral conse-
quences are outside the scope of representation required by the Sixth Amendment,”
and, therefore, the “failure of defense counsel to advise the defendant of possible depor-
tation consequences is not cognizable as a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.”13
The Supreme Court disagreed and refused to apply “a distinction between direct
and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable profes-
sional assistance’ required under Strickland.”14 The Court declined to consider whether
or not any such distinction is appropriate because Padilla involved the “particularly
severe ‘penalty’” of deportation.15 The Court stated that “because of its close connection
to the criminal process,” deportation was “uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct
or a collateral consequence.”16 The Court held that “counsel must inform her client
whether his plea carries a risk of deportation.”17 This holding was grounded in the
Court’s “longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as
a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on families
living lawfully in this country.”18
The Supreme Court characterized deportation as “the equivalent of banishment or
exile.”19 Coupled with the severity of deportation is the recognition that “[p]reserving
the client’s right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than
any potential jail sentence.”20 As dramatic as the Court’s holding was on one level,21 on
another the Court simply recognized the obvious: a defendant who is offered a plea bar-
gain wherein he would not serve any time in jail but would be deported might forego
the plea bargain and risk going to jail in the hope that he would be acquitted and thus
avoid deportation.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla could have a profound effect on the obli-
gations of criminal defense attorneys; interpreted broadly, there could be a whole range
of collateral consequences that defense attorneys might need to address when coun-
seling clients on the potential benefits and consequences of a plea bargain.22 However,
13 Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483.
14 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
15 Id. (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (Brewer,
J., dissenting)).
16 Id. at 1482.
17 Id. at 1486.
18 Id.
19 Id. (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1947)).
20 Id. at 1483 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001)).
21 See McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of Padilla
v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J. 795 (2011) (discuss-
ing the extent to which Padilla requires defense attorneys to advise their clients about the various
consequences of conviction).
22 Id. at 797; Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences after Padilla v. Kentucky:
From Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 88–92 (2011); Ronald F.
Wright, Padilla and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal Defense, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1515,
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the Supreme Court did place particular emphasis on the severity of deportation as
a sanction as well as the fact that, in Padilla’s case, the consequences of his plea were
obvious.23 It may be that future decisions will limit the requirement that defense counsel
provide advice regarding the consequences of criminal convictions to only instances
where those consequences are deemed to be as “severe” as deportation.24 The Court’s
characterization of deportation as a “severe” penalty may also have an impact on the
right to counsel in deportation proceedings where the Court has yet to recognize a
right to counsel under either the Sixth or the Fourteenth Amendments.25
Regardless of the extent to which the Padilla decision impacts the obligations
of defense counsel in a criminal case or the right to counsel in deportation proceed-
ings, the Court’s decision to view deportation as an enmeshed penalty is of pro-
found importance:
We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe
“penalty,” but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction. Al-
though removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nev-
ertheless intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has
enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for
nearly a century. And, importantly, recent changes in our immi-
gration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a
broad class of noncitizen offenders. Thus, we find it “most diffi-
cult” to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deporta-
tion context.26
The distinction between criminal penalties and civil penalties becomes a distinc-
tion without a difference when it comes to criminal convictions that inevitably lead to
deportation.27 The court simply cannot separate the conviction in criminal court from
1516–19 (2011); Steven Zeidman, Padilla v. Kentucky: Sound and Fury, or Transformative
Impact, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 203, 206–08 (2011).
23 “In the instant case, the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear, and
explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla’s conviction.” Padilla, 130 S. Ct.
at 1483.
24 For a discussion of the limited impact of Padilla on defendants facing deportation, see
Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393 (2011).
25 For a discussion of Padilla’s potential impact on immigration law, see Daniel Kanstroom,
Padilla v. Kentucky and the Evolving Right to Deportation Counsel: Watershed or Work-In-
Progress?, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 305 (2011).
26 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (citations omitted).
27 For a detailed analysis of the distinction between criminal and civil penalties, see William
J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1
(1996). See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991); Carol S.
Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedure
Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775 (1997).
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the ensuing civil penalty which is automatically triggered. This type of enmeshed pen-
alty is “a severe penalty, intimately related to the criminal process, and nearly an auto-
matic result of certain convictions.”28
B. Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper
In March of 2012, two years after Padilla, the Supreme Court decided a pair of
cases that also dealt with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Missouri v.
Frye29 and Lafler v. Cooper,30 the issue was what remedies were available to a de-
fendant who would have accepted a plea bargain offered by the prosecution but for
his attorney’s ineffective assistance.
In Missouri v. Frye, “Galin Frye was charged with driving with a revoked li-
cense.”31 Due to the fact that he had three prior convictions for driving with a revoked
license, the prosecution charged him with a felony that carried a potential sentence of
four years of imprisonment, but also extended an offer of a ninety-day sentence in ex-
change for a guilty plea to a misdemeanor.32 Frye’s lawyer never informed him of the
offer.33 Subsequently, he was arrested again for the same offense, and with no offer
extended by the prosecution, he pled guilty and received a three-year sentence.34
In Lafler v. Cooper, Anthony Cooper was charged with assault with intent to mur-
der and other offenses.35 It was alleged that Cooper fired a gun at the victim repeatedly
and hit her in the hip, abdomen, and buttocks.36 The prosecution offered to recommend
a sentence of fifty-one to eighty-five months in exchange for a guilty plea.37 In a com-
munication to the court, Cooper admitted his guilt and indicated he would accept the
plea offer.38 However, in an obvious legal error, his attorney advised him to reject the
offer on the theory that he could not be convicted of attempted murder because the vic-
tim had been shot below the waist.39 Cooper proceeded to trial and, after conviction,
was sentenced to 185 to 360 months in prison.40
In both cases, the Court emphasized that defendants are entitled to the effective as-
sistance of counsel at all “critical stages” of the proceeding and that plea bargaining is
28 Smyth, supra note 21, at 801.
29 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
30 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
31 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1404–05.
35 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
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a “critical stage[ ].”41 The Court found in Frye that the defense counsel was ineffective
for failing to communicate the prosecution’s plea offer,42 and in Lafler, that the defense
counsel was ineffective for providing deficient advice concerning the advisability of
accepting a plea offer.43 Just as in Padilla, the assertion that a defendant is entitled to
the effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations is not particularly remark-
able; previous decisions by the Court have made that clear.44 What is remarkable is the
Court’s recognition that our system of criminal justice has become wholly dependent
upon plea bargaining.45 While acknowledging that a defendant does not have a right to
a plea bargain, the Court pointed to the “simple reality” that “[n]inety-seven percent of
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty
pleas.”46 Our criminal justice system “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a sys-
tem of trials.”47 Plea bargains were described by the Court as “central to the administra-
tion of the criminal justice system.”48 The Court also recognized the practical effect of
a criminal justice system which relies almost exclusively on plea bargaining: “In
41 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012); see Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384.
42 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410.
43 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384.
44 In both Frye and Lafler, the Court cites Padilla for this proposition. Frye, 132 S. Ct.
at 1406; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384. In Padilla itself the Court cites Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52, 57 (1985), and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770–71 (1970). For the proposition
that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, see Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
1486 (2009). See also Norman L. Reimer, Frye and Lafler: Much Ado About What We Do—
And What Prosecutors and Judges Should Not Do, CHAMPION, Apr. 2012, at 7, 7 (stating
that it has long been recognized that competent representation requires lawyers to notify their
clients of plea offers).
45 See Stephanos Bibas, Taming Negotiated Justice, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 35, 35 (2012),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/06/20/bibas.html (“After four decades of neglecting laissez-faire
plea bargaining, the Supreme Court got it right. In Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, the
Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment regulates plea bargaining.” (footnotes omitted)).
46 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (citing DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, tbl. 5.22.2009, http://www.albany.edu
/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf; SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2010), avail-
able at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf; Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485–86
(recognizing that pleas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions)).
47 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.
48 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. “To a large extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and de-
fense counsel] determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is.
It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” Id. (citing
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912
(1992)); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 989, 1034 (2006) (“[Defendants] who do take their case to trial and lose receive longer sen-
tences than even Congress or the prosecutor might think appropriate, because the longer sen-
tences exist on the books largely for bargaining purposes.”).
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today’s criminal justice system, therefore, the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than
the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant.”49
What is also significant about the Court’s finding of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel in Lafler is that the defendant was found guilty following a trial.50 Even though the
defendant received effective assistance at trial, that fact was not sufficient to undo the
harm the defendant suffered because of his counsel’s ineffective assistance during plea
negotiations.51 The “claim that the sole purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to protect
the right to a fair trial” was rejected by the Court.52
Padilla, Frye, and Lafler all dealt with the adequacy of defense counsel’s perfor-
mance during plea bargaining. These cases addressed the application of Strickland’s
prejudice test when counsel is alleged to have misinformed the defendant about the con-
sequences of his plea, failed to convey a favorable plea bargain, or misinformed the de-
fendant about the advisability of accepting a plea bargain. While all three cases address
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, there are two components of the Court’s de-
cisions which suggest that these cases have broader implications for the right to counsel
under the Sixth Amendment.
The first is Padilla’s recognition that there are some things of greater consequence
to a defendant than the length of time he or she could potentially spend in jail.53 Padilla
stands for the proposition that the decision to accept or reject a plea bargain is not sim-
ply based on an effort to minimize the amount of time a defendant may have to spend
in jail. For some defendants, jail simply isn’t the issue; it is the conviction and the en-
meshed penalties that flow from it that are paramount.
The second implication is that our adversarial system of justice seldom resolves dis-
putes through trials and instead relies almost exclusively on plea bargaining.54 The ef-
fective assistance of counsel required by the Sixth Amendment has more to do with the
lawyer’s ability to negotiate with the prosecution and counsel his or her client than with
the ability to litigate. Before exploring how these elements of the Court’s decisions in
Padilla, Frye, and Lafler impact the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, it
is first necessary to briefly review the ways in which the right to counsel has historically
been interpreted by the Court.
49 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
50 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.
51 Id. at 1386 (“Even if the trial itself is free from constitutional flaw, the defendant who goes
to trial instead of taking a more favorable plea may be prejudiced from either a conviction on
more serious counts or the imposition of a more severe sentence.”).
52 Id. at 1385–86.
53 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (“We too have previously recognized
that ‘[p]reserving the client’s right to remain in the United States may be more important to
the client than any potential jail sentence.’” (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
54 See id. at 1485 (“Pleas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions.”).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
The need for the assistance of counsel to present an adequate defense was first rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama,55 more than thirty years before
the Court’s landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.56 Powell was actually decided
not under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but rather under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.57 The defendants in Powell were charged with a
capital crime, and there was no question regarding their entitlement to counsel under
state statute.58 The question presented to the Court was whether the defendants in fact
were represented by counsel during their trial and, if so, whether they had been given
an opportunity to consult with counsel in advance of the trial.59 The Court held that the
defendants had counsel in name only and that the absence of effective counsel at their
trial amounted to a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.60
Using language that would echo throughout the Gideon decision, the Court stated:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the in-
telligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, gener-
ally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or
bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the
aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the
issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowl-
edge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a per-
fect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty,
he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how
to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence,
how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of
feeble intellect.61
The Court’s reasoning in Powell is based on the assumption that no one who is not
a lawyer is capable of defending himself or herself. The Court does not believe that
55 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
56 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
57 Powell, 287 U.S. at 60.
58 Id. at 48.
59 Id. at 50, 52.
60 Id. at 71.
61 Id. at 68–69.
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even the “intelligent and educated layman” could adequately defend him- or herself.62
It is worth considering that today the vast majority of criminal defendants are too poor
to hire their own counsel.63 This makes the Court’s concerns regarding “ignorant and
illiterate” defendants even more significant when we consider the link between poverty
and education.64 Our adversarial criminal justice system simply cannot function prop-
erly without the “guiding hand of counsel.”65 The Court also believes that counsel is
needed at “every step” of the proceedings to ensure fundamental fairness; thus, the right
to counsel is not simply a right to have the assistance of counsel at trial, but throughout
the entire criminal prosecution.66
Not long after the Court’s decision in Powell, the Court specifically addressed the
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment in Johnson v. Zerbst.67 In Zerbst, the issue
was whether the defendants had waived their right to counsel. In ruling that they had
not waived the right, the Court spoke about the importance of the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee that the accused have the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions:
This is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed nec-
essary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty. Omit-
ted from the Constitution as originally adopted, provisions of this
and other Amendments were submitted by the first Congress con-
vened under that Constitution as essential barriers against arbitrary
or unjust deprivation of human rights. The Sixth Amendment
stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards
62 Id. at 69. But see Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2517–21 (2011) (finding that “alter-
native procedural safeguards” could be used to guard against an “erroneous deprivation of
liberty” in a civil contempt proceeding).
63 In 1998, approximately two-thirds of federal-felony defendants, and in 1996, more than
eighty percent of felony defendants in the country’s seventy-five largest counties were repre-
sented by publicly funded counsel. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES (2000), available at
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf. Specifically, in federal court, 30.1% of all defendants
were represented by counsel from a public defender organization, and 36.3% were represented
by a court-appointed attorney. Id. In the large state courts, 68.3% were represented by public
defenders, and 13.7% were represented by assigned counsel. Id.
64 The U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics keeps detailed data on income
and educational attainment. The Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Workers for the
second quarter of 2012 estimates that “full-time workers age 25 and over without a high school
diploma had median weekly earnings of $483, compared with $659 for high school graduates
(no college) and $1,164 for those holding at least a bachelor’s degree.” U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, USUAL WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS:
SECOND QUARTER 2012, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/wkyeng_0718
2012.pdf.
65 Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69.
66 Id. at 69.
67 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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it provides be lost, justice will not “still be done.” It embodies a
realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defen-
dant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself
when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or lib-
erty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and
learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly, and necessary to the
lawyer, to the untrained layman, may appear intricate, complex
and mysterious.68
Once again, the Supreme Court speaks about the necessity of having defense coun-
sel in a criminal case and recognizes the “obvious truth” that the average defendant
stands little chance of adequately defending himself.69 The Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, as it was in Powell, is associated with the right to be heard, a right which can
be thought of as enabling other “constitutional safeguards.”70
Neither Powell nor Zerbst established a constitutional right to have counsel ap-
pointed in criminal cases where the defendant was indigent.71 Nevertheless, in both
cases the Court’s reasoning seemed to indicate that, under either the Sixth Amend-
ment’s right to counsel clause or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
counsel was required to ensure the fairness of our adversarial system. When the Court
next considered the question of the right to counsel under the federal constitution in
Betts v. Brady,72 it was widely expected that the Court would hold that the concept of
“due process of law” incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment would require state
courts to appoint counsel to indigent defendants in criminal cases in state court. Some-
what surprisingly, the Court decided against such a requirement.73 Instead, the Court
68 Id. at 462–63 (footnote omitted).
69 Id. at 462.
70 Id. As the Supreme Court noted in Powell, “[t]he right to be heard would be, in many
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.” 287 U.S. at 68–69.
71 That may have been in part due to the Court’s observation in Powell that
[t]he United States by statute and every state in the Union by express pro-
vision of law, or by the determination of its courts, make it the duty of the
trial judge, where the accused is unable to employ counsel, to appoint
counsel for him. In most states the rule applies broadly to all criminal
prosecutions, in others it is limited to the more serious crimes, and in
a very limited number, to capital cases. A rule adopted with such unani-
mous accord reflects, if it does not establish, the inherent right to have
counsel appointed, at least in cases like the present, and lends convincing
support to the conclusion we have reached as to the fundamental nature
of that right.
287 U.S. at 73.
72 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
73 Id. at 461–62 (“The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate,
as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment, although a denial by a State of
rights or privileges specifically embodied in that and others of the first eight amendments may,
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found “that appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right” and “has generally been
deemed one of legislative policy.”74 The Court did hold that trial courts have the power
“to appoint counsel where that course seems to be required in the interest of fairness.”75
Instead of a categorical rule requiring the appointment of counsel in all criminal
cases, the Court limited the appointment of counsel to those cases which present
special circumstances.76
It is worth noting that even though the Court in Betts failed to recognize the right
to counsel as a fundamental right, the Court continued to recognize, at least in some cir-
cumstances, the need for “the guiding hand of counsel.”77 In Hamilton v. Alabama,78
the Court found a defendant had a right to an attorney at his arraignment. The Court’s
holding was based on the fact that certain defenses were unavailable to a defendant un-
less they were pled at the time of arraignment.79 The Court specifically referenced
Powell and the notion that counsel was needed “at every step in the proceedings,”
because without the benefit of counsel, “he faces the danger of conviction because he
does not know how to establish his innocence.”80 The Court went on to acknowledge
that “the same pitfalls or like ones face an accused in Alabama who is arraigned with-
out having counsel at his side.”81 The Court declared arraignment in Alabama to be a
“critical stage in a criminal proceeding” by virtue of the fact that “[w]hat happens
there may affect the whole trial.”82 Although Hamilton is not typically regarded as a
decision of great significance, it was the first time the Court used the phrase “critical
stage” when evaluating when counsel is required in a criminal proceeding.83
A. Gideon v. Wainwright
Two decades after the creation of the “special circumstances rule,” the Court revis-
ited its decision in Betts and declared that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was
in certain circumstances, or in connection with other elements, operate, in a given case, to deprive
a litigant of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth.” (footnotes omitted)).
74 Id. at 471.
75 Id. at 472.
76 Id. at 471–72.
77 Id. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting).
78 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
79 Id. at 53–54.
80 Id. at 54 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)). It is worth noting that the Court’s
reference to a defendant proving his innocence is at odds with the constitutional requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases.
81 Id. at 55.
82 Id. at 54.
83 See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (finding a preliminary hearing under
Maryland law to be a “critical” stage of the proceeding). Both Hamilton and White made refer-
ence to the fact that the defendant lost certain rights at trial during the preliminary proceedings
which led some state courts (Alabama and Maryland) to conclude that the initial arraignment or
a preliminary hearing was not a “critical stage” unless it had an impact on the defendant’s rights
at trial. Id.; Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 54.
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indeed a fundamental right.84 In overruling Betts, the Court characterized that decision
as “an abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents.”85 The Court referenced
both Powell and Zerbst and restored “constitutional principles established to achieve
a fair system of justice.”86 The language used by the Court in Gideon made it clear that
the right to counsel played a central role in our criminal justice system:
Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us
to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems
to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal,
quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to
try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are every-
where deemed essential to protect the public’s interest in an orderly
society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime,
few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare
and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prose-
cute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend
are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers
in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.87
The language used by the Court in Gideon is sweeping. Without an attorney, the
fairness of the adversarial system is cast into doubt, something which the Court regards
as an “obvious truth.”88 Lawyers were absolutely necessary in criminal cases and the
right to counsel was a fundamental right. When hearing the Court’s pronouncement
concerning the right to counsel in Gideon, one can hear the echoes of the language used
in The Declaration of Independence: that some truths are “self-evident.”89
The Supreme Court’s declaration in Gideon that “[t]he right of one charged with
crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental . . . in some countries, but it is in
ours”90 was founded upon the right to counsel “in all criminal prosecutions” guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment.91 The reasoning used by the Court in Gideon was that, with-
out counsel, a person too poor to hire an attorney could not receive a fair trial.92 While
84 See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
85 Id. at 344.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
90 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
91 Id. at 339.
92 Id. at 344.
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Gideon dealt with a felony charge, as had Powell, the Court’s decision was based on
the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment “in all criminal prosecutions.”93 Still,
whether the Sixth Amendment required the appointment of counsel to indigent de-
fendants in every case, or only in felony cases, remained an open question follow-
ing Gideon.94
B. The Application of Gideon to Critical Stages
That question would be answered almost a decade later by the Supreme Court in
Argersinger v. Hamlin,95 but in the intervening years the Court extended the right to
counsel to other “critical stages” of the proceedings in addition to trial. The year after
Gideon was decided, the Court ruled in Massiah v. United States96 that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel prohibits the use of incriminating statements against a
defendant if they were obtained by federal agents after he had been indicted and in the
absence of counsel.97 The Court based its holding on “a constitutional principle estab-
lished . . . long ago” by Powell that the accused is entitled to the aid of counsel from
the time of his arraignment until the beginning of trial.98 In Escobedo v. Illinois,99 the
Court found the refusal by the police to allow a suspect to consult with counsel while
in custody but before charges were filed also violated the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.100 The suspect admitted to being complicit in a murder plot, unaware that
under Illinois law at that time an admission of “mere” complicity in a murder plot was
as legally damaging as an admission of firing the fatal shots.101 The Court found that
counsel was needed “to advise petitioner of his rights in this delicate situation”102 and
that the interrogation was “the stage when legal aid and advice were most critical.”103
Two years after Massiah and Escobedo, the Court’s decision in Miranda v.
Arizona104 established a right to consult with an attorney during custodial interrogation.
While the Miranda decision is rooted in the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, the right to an attorney guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment was seen
as a necessary corollary to ensure the exercise of one’s Fifth Amendment right to
93 Id. at 339.
94 See id. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Whether the rule should extend to all criminal
cases need not now be decided.”).
95 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
96 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
97 Id. at 206.
98 Id. at 205.
99 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
100 Id. at 490–91.
101 Id. at 479, 486.
102 Id. at 486.
103 Id. at 486 (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204).
104 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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remain silent.105 The Court next extended the right to counsel under the Sixth Amend-
ment to pretrial identification proceedings in United States v. Wade.106 In Wade, the
Court found that there was a
grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in the pretrial
lineup, which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial, and
since presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and as-
sure a meaningful confrontation at trial, there can be little doubt
that for Wade the post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of
the prosecution at which he was “as much entitled to such aid [of
counsel] . . . as at the trial itself.”107
Relying on the principles established in Powell, the Court found it necessary to
scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine
whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the
defendant’s basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right mean-
ingfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have ef-
fective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.108
That same year the Court also decided Mempa v. Rhay,109 which held that a proba-
tioner was entitled to counsel at the time his probation was revoked because “certain
105 Id. at 469. (“The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very
quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators.
Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection
of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today.”).
106 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
107 Id. at 236–37 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (footnote omitted)). The
Court also stated:
When the Bill of Rights was adopted, there were no organized police
forces as we know them today. The accused confronted the prosecutor and
the witnesses against him, and the evidence was marshaled, largely at the
trial itself. In contrast, today’s law enforcement machinery involves criti-
cal confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings
where the results might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial
itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these realities of modern crimi-
nal prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee
to apply to “critical” stages of the proceedings.
Id. at 224.
108 Id. at 227. The Court declined to extend the right to counsel to a post-indictment photo-
graphic display in United States v. Ash because the same concerns that existed in Wade were not
applicable to a photographic display shown to a witness. 413 U.S. 300 (1973). In reviewing the
historical expansion of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court did note that “the test
utilized by the Court has called for examination of the event in order to determine whether the
accused required aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary.” Id.
at 313.
109 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
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legal rights may be lost if not exercised at this stage.”110 The Court found the proceed-
ing in Rhay to be “a deferred sentencing” and not simply “a revocation of probation.”111
While the Court noted that there had not been a need “to enumerate the various stages
in a criminal proceeding at which counsel was required,” in Gideon, it reiterated that
counsel “is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of
a criminal accused may be affected.”112 While sentencing was thus a “critical stage” for
the purposes of a defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, parole revo-
cation hearings as well as probation revocation hearings were ruled not to fall within
the definition of a “criminal prosecution,” and therefore counsel was not required.113
The Court also held in Kirby v. Illinois114 that the right to counsel attaches “only at
or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated.”115 The Court
was clear that the right to counsel exists before the commencement of a trial, but be-
cause the Sixth Amendment guarantees the assistance of counsel in all criminal prose-
cutions, a criminal prosecution must be initiated before it is applicable.116 It is at that
point that the “defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized
society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.”117
While the right to counsel had been extended to various stages of the criminal pro-
ceeding in the years following Gideon, there was still a lingering question regarding the
right to counsel for misdemeanors, or “petty” offenses. Those hoping to see the Court’s
expansion of the right to counsel come to an end were presumably encouraged by the
Court’s decision in Duncan v. Louisiana,118 where the Court declined to extend the
Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial to “petty” offenses.119 The very same argument,
110 Id. at 135.
111 Id. at 137.
112 Id. at 134.
113 The Supreme Court found that these hearings were not part of the “criminal proceedings”
against the defendants because they occurred after sentencing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778 (1973) (discussing a probation revocation hearing); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) (discussing a parole revocation hearing).
114 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
115 Id. at 688.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 689.
118 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). While the Supreme Court bases the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel on the actual sentence imposed and not the categorization of the
offense, the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury is based on the categorization of the offense
without regard to the actual sentence imposed. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S.
538 (1989).
119 The Court recognized in Blanton that there were certain “petty” offenses which fell outside
of the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541. The Court defined
“petty” offenses by focusing on the objective seriousness of the offense, specifically the severity
of the maximum punishment authorized. Ultimately, the Court concluded that a potential sen-
tence of six months of incarceration coupled with a $1,000 fine was not severe enough to re-
quire trial by jury. Id. at 543–45. Nevertheless, the Court left open the possibility that other
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that “petty” offenses do not implicate the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel, was ad-
vanced in Argersinger v. Hamlin.120
In Argersinger, the Court rejected the idea that a distinction should be made based
on the seriousness of the offense and concluded that “the problems associated with mis-
demeanor and petty offenses often require the presence of counsel to insure the ac-
cused a fair trial.”121 That reasoning is entirely consistent with the justifications offered
in Powell and Gideon that the average person is simply unable to effectively represent
themselves in a criminal proceeding. However, while rejecting the idea that the classifi-
cation of the offense should impact the applicability of the Sixth Amendment’s right to
counsel, the Court did not rule that the Sixth Amendment actually applies to “all crimi-
nal prosecutions.”122 The Court ruled that a defendant’s conviction must result in incar-
ceration for the right to attach.123
The Court’s decision to limit the right to counsel to cases of actual incarceration is
completely at odds with its reasoning in Powell and Gideon124 as well as being inter-
nally inconsistent because the Court recognizes that even “petty” offenses can involve
complex legal issues.125 The Court recognized that “legal and constitutional questions
involved in a case that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period are
[not] any less complex than when a person can be sent off for six months or more.”126
Because the defendant in Argersinger was actually sentenced to ninety days of incar-
ceration following his trial, the Court did not consider “the requirements of the Sixth
Amendment as regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved.”127
penalties might indicate that the offense was considered serious enough by the legislature to
require trial by jury:
In using the word “penalty,” we do not refer solely to the maximum prison
term authorized for a particular offense. A legislature’s view of the seri-
ousness of an offense also is reflected in the other penalties that it attaches
to the offense. We thus examine “whether the length of the authorized
prison term or the seriousness of other punishment is enough in itself
to require a jury trial.”
Id. at 542 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968)). While this Article limits
itself to the argument that the right to counsel is implicated by enmeshed penalties, a similar
argument could be made regarding a right to a jury trial.
120 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
121 Id. at 36–37 (footnote omitted).
122 See Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487,
517–18 (2009).
123 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37 (“We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor,
or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” (footnote omitted)).
124 See infra Part II.C.
125 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 25 (“Many petty offenses will also present complex legal and
factual issues that may not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by counsel.”).
126 Id. at 33.
127 Id. at 37.
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Viewed narrowly, Argersinger stands for the proposition “that absent a knowing
and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified
as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”128
It leaves open the possibility that other factors might trigger the right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion because he agreed
that “[m]any petty offenses will also present complex legal and factual issues that may
not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by counsel,” but he found the “inflexi-
ble rule of the majority opinion” problematic.129 He emphasized that “[s]erious conse-
quences also may result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment” and found
that the majority’s reasoning “for extending the right to counsel to all cases in which
the penalty of any imprisonment is imposed applies equally well to cases in which other
penalties may be imposed.”130
It is significant that the Court took the position that “[h]ow crimes should be clas-
sified is largely a state matter.”131 The Court never attempts to define what is or is not
a “crime” when applying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Instead, the Court
found that the sentence in a particular case is the proper indicator of what should be
considered a “crime.”132 This reasoning would make sense if a conviction for any
“crime” always involved a sentence of incarceration, but that was not the case at the
time Argersinger was decided and it is even less so today because of the enmeshed pen-
alties that come with conviction.
C. Actual Incarceration
Not long after the decision in Argersinger, the Court declined to extend the right
to counsel to a defendant who was only facing a fine and reiterated that the right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment is tied to incarceration.133 In Scott v. Illinois, the
128 Id.
129 Id. at 47, 49 (Powell, J., concurring).
130 Id. at 48, 52. Justice Powell favored a more flexible standard for the appointment of coun-
sel which would take into consideration the complexity of the offense charged, the probable sen-
tence, and individual factors peculiar to the cases. Id. at 64.
131 Id. at 38 (footnote omitted); see also Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)
(“Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory
construction. A court must first ask whether the legislature, ‘in establishing the penalizing mecha-
nism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other.’” (citation
omitted) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1990))).
132 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40.
133 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979); see also Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses,
Drastic Consequences: Toward a Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants
Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 585, 593 (2011) (“While some states have gone
beyond Scott to provide counsel in all criminal cases, in cases involving substantial fines, or for
all cases involving offenses punishable by imprisonment (regardless of whether a sentence of
imprisonment is imposed), other states have hewn to Scott’s minimal requirement. Some states
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defendant was convicted of theft and fined $50 although the maximum sentenced au-
thorized was a $500 fine or one year in jail or both.134 The various concurring opinions
filed in Argersinger created some ambiguity as to the limitations imposed on the right
to counsel in cases where incarceration was authorized but not actually imposed.135 The
Court’s holding in Scott solidified the actual incarceration standard:
Although the intentions of the Argersinger Court are not unmis-
takably clear from its opinion, we conclude today that Argersinger
did indeed delimit the constitutional right to appointed counsel in
state criminal proceedings. Even were the matter res nova, we be-
lieve that the central premise of Argersinger—that actual impris-
onment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat
of imprisonment—is eminently sound and warrants adoption of
actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to
appointment of counsel. Argersinger has proved reasonably work-
able, whereas any extension would create confusion and impose
unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse
States. We therefore hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution require only that no indi-
gent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of ap-
pointed counsel in his defense.136
Argersinger and Scott ignore the emphasis in Powell and Gideon on the ability of
a defendant to effectively represent himself and instead focus only on the penalty im-
posed. The Court’s development of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment
underwent a radical shift. While initially counsel was seen to be essential for due pro-
cess of law and for fundamental fairness, those concerns about the legitimacy of the
process were ultimately cast aside in favor of a “one day in jail rule.”137 While the right
to counsel began as a procedural right, it has become tied to the outcome of a case. The
allow trial courts to avoid appointing counsel simply by certifying that they will not impose in-
carceration regardless of the seriousness of the misdemeanor offense or the possibility that it will
carry other consequences. (In Florida and Maine, courts can use this mechanism even for felony
offenses.) The number of defendants convicted without counsel may well be increasing in the
current depressed economy as states look to save money by cutting back on both incarceration
and counsel.” (footnotes omitted)).
134 Scott, 440 U.S. at 368.
135 See Steven Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 601, 604–05 (describing Justice Powell’s concurrence and courts’ various readings
of Argersinger); see also Scott, 440 U.S. at 368–69 (discussing the “question left open” in
Argersinger and petitioner’s argument regarding authorized penalties).
136 Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–74 (footnotes omitted).
137 Id. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring).
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formerly “obvious truth”138 that a layperson is not capable of adequately defending
himself was replaced by the dubious classification of an offense as criminal only if it
results in incarceration.
Consequently, under the Sixth Amendment the right to counsel is not tied to the
categorization of the offense, the complexity of the legal issues involved, or even the
potential sentence. The defendant could be charged with drug possession, there could
be Fourth Amendment issues regarding the search and seizure of the defendant, and the
maximum penalty authorized for the offense could exceed a year in prison, but if the
judge decides that a sentence of imprisonment will not follow a conviction, then the de-
fendant does not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Scott limited the right to counsel to cases of actual imprisonment, with the Court
reasoning “that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere
threat of imprisonment.”139 But it is important to recognize that the Court contemplates
only those penalties traditionally used in criminal cases: jail, fines, or probation. The
Court does not acknowledge the wide range of penalties that result from a criminal con-
viction and which are now an integral part of our criminal justice system.140
In Alabama v. Shelton,141 the Court was confronted with a novel approach to sen-
tencing which reflects states’ efforts to avoid providing counsel to indigent defendants
who are facing misdemeanor charges. The defendant, without counsel, was tried and
convicted of third-degree assault and sentenced to a jail term of thirty days, which the
trial court immediately, suspended and then placed the defendant on probation for two
years.142 The Court found that the critical stage of the proceeding is the stage at which
the defendant’s “guilt or innocence of the charged crime is decided and his vulnerability
to imprisonment is determined.”143 Therefore the failure to provide the defendant with
counsel at the time he was convicted violated the Sixth Amendment.144
Recently, in Rothgery v. Gillespie County,145 the Court reaffirmed that the right to
counsel begins at the time adversarial judicial criminal proceedings are initiated. The
Court noted that once the right to counsel attaches, “the accused at least is entitled to
the presence of appointed counsel during any ‘critical stage’ of the postattachment pro-
ceedings,” and that “what makes a stage critical is what shows the need for counsel’s
presence.”146 In a somewhat puzzling footnote, the Court stated that it was not making
any judgment regarding “the scope of an individual’s postattachment right to the pres-
ence of counsel.”147 In other words, the right to counsel undoubtedly attaches at the
138 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1962).
139 Scott, 440 U.S. at 373.
140 Duke, supra note 135, at 615–16.
141 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
142 Id. at 658.
143 Id. at 674.
144 Id. at 667.
145 554 U.S. 191 (2008).
146 Id. at 212 (footnote omitted).
147 Id. at 212 n.15.
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commencement of adversarial judicial proceedings, but the absence of counsel may
not automatically result in prejudice to a defendant.148
D. Effective Assistance of Counsel
In Strickland v. Washington149 and United States v. Cronic,150 the Supreme Court
ruled the right to counsel guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment includes the right to
effective representation. In Strickland, the Court found that the question at issue when
evaluating an ineffectiveness claim is “whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.”151 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant
“must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reason-
ableness.”152 That involves demonstrating that counsel’s performance was deficient
by showing “that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the de-
fendant by the Sixth Amendment” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense.”153
Strickland, like Scott, focuses on the outcome of the case. It is not enough to dem-
onstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;
a defendant who seeks to overturn a conviction must also demonstrate some form of
prejudice. In Cronic, the Court acknowledged that prejudice need not be shown in
cases where no actual assistance was provided because to hold otherwise would turn
the appointment of counsel into a “mere” formality.154 With that being said, the Court
148 This raises the question of whether the initial appearance where a defendant’s liberty
interest is at stake because bail may be set qualifies as a “critical stage” of the proceedings.
The Supreme Court has never definitively stated that pretrial incarceration implicates the right
to counsel, which is surprising considering the adoption of the “actual incarceration” standard.
Two recent state court decisions suggest that a bail hearing is indeed a “critical stage” which
requires the presence of counsel. DeWolfe v. Richmond, No. 34, 2012 WL 10863 (Md. Jan. 4,
2012); Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010). Nevertheless, an argument can be
made that if none of the defendant’s rights at trial are implicated at a bail hearing, then counsel
need not be present.
149 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
150 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
151 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
152 Id. at 688.
153 Id. at 687.
154 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 655 (quoting Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court went on to find that there may be some circumstances
where, “although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any
lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a pre-
sumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.” Id. at
659–60 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)). These types of situations have begun
to occur as public defender caseloads have become excessive and in instances where under-
funding of indigent defense services has led to a complete breakdown in the adversarial system.
David Carroll, MO Supreme Court Rules that Public Defense Commission Can Decline Cases,
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also found that absent some effect “on the reliability of the trial process, the Sixth
Amendment guarantee is generally not implicated.”155 The Court dismissed external
factors such as the attorney’s level of experience or the amount of time he had to pre-
pare a case for trial as determinative of an ineffectiveness claim and instead focused
on “specific errors made by trial counsel.”156 The following year, the Court extended
Strickland’s standard for ineffectiveness to claims arising out of the plea process.157
E. The Influence of Argersinger and Scott
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Argersinger and Scott made it possible for states
to avoid having to appoint counsel for the indigent in criminal cases as long as a defen-
dant was not sentenced to incarceration.158 However, the “actual incarceration” standard
for the appointment of counsel under the Sixth Amendment announced in Argersinger
and validated in Scott has not been generally adopted by the states.159 In California,
defendants are entitled to representation in any felony or misdemeanor prosecution,
whether or not it results in imprisonment.160 The same is true in Indiana, where the
state constitution guarantees the right to counsel for misdemeanors and felonies alike,
regardless of whether actual imprisonment is imposed.161 New York requires counsel
in any “criminal proceeding[ ],”162 and Washington requires counsel when a defen-
dant is charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment.163 Maryland requires the
Office of the Public Defender to represent anyone charged with a “serious offense,”
which includes a felony, a misdemeanor, or an “offense punishable by confinement
for more than [three] months or a fine of more than $500.”164 Alaska has gone so far
SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR. (Aug. 7, 2012), http://sixthamendment.org/mo-supreme-court-rules
-that-public-defense-commission-can-decline-cases/ (discussing Missouri’s overloaded public
defender system); Adam Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense,
40 CONN. L. REV. 85, 103 (2007).
155 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658.
156 Id. at 666.
157 See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
158 Paul Marcus, Why the United States Supreme Court Got Some (but not a lot) of the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel Analysis Right, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 142, 146–47 (2009).
159 See id. at 149–50 (“While the United States Supreme Court has not been overly generous
in granting counsel in cases in which imprisonment is not ultimately ordered, many states go
beyond the federal constitutional requirement. Instead of looking to actual imprisonment [or
suspended sentences], they either provide counsel to poor people in all criminal cases, or in all
cases other than the most minor infractions.” (footnotes omitted)).
160 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15. See generally In re Lopez, 465 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1970); In
re Smiley, 427 P.2d 179 (Cal. 1967); In re Johnson, 398 P.2d 420 (Cal. 1965).
161 See Brunson v. State, 394 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (interpreting Article 1,
Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution).
162 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.10 (McKinney 2010).
163 See State v. Osborne, 855 P.2d 302, 305 (Wash. 1993).
164 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-204(b)(1)(i) (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
PROC. § 16-101(h)(1)(2) (West 2008).
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as to recognize a state constitutional right to counsel when a conviction may result in
the loss of a valuable license,165 and New Jersey has found there to be a statutory right
to counsel whenever a defendant faces a “consequence of magnitude,” which includes
the revocation of a driver’s license.166
Other states have tried to deal with the inherent unpredictability of a standard that
requires a trial judge to make a determination at the start of a case whether he will im-
pose a sentence of incarceration if the defendant is convicted by establishing a right
to counsel in any case which may result in incarceration.167 Some states require that
a judge explicitly state that imprisonment will not be imposed before proceeding with-
out counsel.168 Some states even allow the prosecutor to certify that he or she will
not request a sentence of incarceration, thus divesting the trial court of the discretion
envisioned by the Supreme Court in Argersinger.169
F. The Intersection of Critical Stages and Actual Incarceration
Despite the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to counsel in all criminal
prosecutions, an indigent defendant can be tried and convicted of a crime without coun-
sel as long as he is not sentenced to incarceration.170 However, in Padilla, the Court
acknowledged that there are some consequences, such as the possibility of deportation,
165 See Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910, 913 (Alaska 1971) (construing
Article I, Section 11 of the Alaska Constitution).
166 Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 277 A.2d 216, 223 (N.J. 1971).
167 Arizona requires counsel when imprisonment is a possibility. See Campa v. Fleming, 656
P.2d 619 (Ariz. 1982) (interpreting Rule 6.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure). Iowa
has a statute which establishes a right to counsel when the defendant faces the possibility of in-
carceration. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 2.61 (West 2013). Missouri has a statute which authorizes
counsel when a defendant probably will be imprisoned. See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 18, § 10-
2.010 (2013). Wyoming grants the right to counsel when a defendant is charged with a crime
and imprisonment is a practical possibility. See Brisson v. State, 955 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1998).
168 Arkansas follows the actual incarceration standard but requires that a judge decide before-
hand that imprisonment will not be part of the sentence if a defendant is convicted. See Calloway
v. State, No. CACR00-1317, 2001 WL 651359, at *2 (Ark. Ct. App. June 13, 2001). Florida also
follows the actual incarceration standard but requires the trial judge to affirmatively state, in
writing and before trial, that a defendant will not be incarcerated if convicted. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 3.111(b)(1) (West 2013).
169 In Minnesota, “the prosecutor may certify . . . the offense as a petty misdemeanor if the
prosecutor does not seek incarceration and seeks a fine at or below the statutory maximum for
a petty misdemeanor.” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 23.04 (West 2012). In Colorado
the prosecuting attorney may, at any time during the prosecution, state
in writing whether or not he or she will seek incarceration as part of the
penalty upon conviction of an offense for which the defendant has been
charged. If the prosecuting attorney does not seek incarceration as part
of such penalty, legal representation and supporting services need not
thereafter be provided for the defendant at state expense.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-501 (2012).
170 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
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that outweigh the threat of actual incarceration.171 The Court also recognizes that the
right to the effective assistance of counsel can be triggered by something other than the
threat of incarceration. It is this untethering of the right to counsel to actual incarcera-
tion that undercuts the Court’s precedent requiring the appointment of counsel under
the Sixth Amendment only when a defendant is actually incarcerated.
The connection between the right to counsel and actual incarceration is eroded
even further by the Court’s decisions in Frye and Lafler.172 It is difficult to reconcile
the Court’s acknowledgement of the importance of representation during the plea-
bargaining stage with the limitations on the right to counsel imposed by the actual in-
carceration standard. What makes these two competing standards problematic is that
one focuses on the significance of a particular event during the criminal prosecution
while the other focuses on the end result. The Court’s recognition that criminal convic-
tions have enmeshed penalties that a defendant may be more concerned about than in-
carceration, and that defendants are entitled to be advised by counsel of those enmeshed
penalties, clearly undercuts the idea that counsel needs to be appointed only in cases
where actual incarceration will result.
While the Court recognized in Argersinger “that the problems associated with
misdemeanor and petty offenses often require the presence of counsel to insure . . . a
fair trial,”173 it simultaneously limited the right to have the assistance of counsel to cope
with those “problems” to cases that result in actual incarceration.174 It makes no sense
to say that counsel is necessary to ensure a fair trial, but only in cases where the defen-
dant is actually incarcerated. The absence of incarceration as a sentence does not ren-
der the trial process any more or less fair. The actual incarceration requirement attaches
the right to counsel to a particular event, one which follows the trial, rather than to a
particular point in the criminal prosecution; thus it is result-oriented and not process-
oriented. This brings it into conflict with the Court’s decision to view effective counsel
as a requirement during “critical stages” of the prosecution, a standard which focuses
on the specific stage of the proceeding and not the ultimate result.175
Thought of another way, there are two prerequisites to the application of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel: the particular stage of the proceeding must be a
“critical stage,” and, in the event the defendant is convicted, the sentence must be to
some period of incarceration. These two requirements are not completely incompatible,
but their combined application leads to some questionable results, as the following
examples illustrate:
• If counsel is assigned to a misdemeanor case for an indigent defendant
and during plea negotiations is able to convince the judge not impose
171 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010).
172 See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376,
1384 (2012).
173 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972) (footnote omitted).
174 Id. at 37.
175 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224–25 (1967).
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a sentence of incarceration should the defendant be convicted, then the
judge can proceed from that point without counsel.
• If a prosecutor realizes that a defendant would be subject to deportation
if convicted, then he or she could ask the presiding judge to not impose
a sentence of incarceration and require an indigent defendant to proceed
to trial without counsel.176
• If a defendant’s conviction will result in loss of employment and loss of
housing, but no sentence of incarceration will be imposed, then he or she
has no right to counsel.
• If a defendant is charged with a possessory offense, such as the possession
of drugs or a firearm, but no sentence of incarceration will be imposed,
then the defendant has no right to the assistance of counsel when litigating
the reasonableness of the search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
• If a defendant is charged with a petty offense, such as disorderly conduct,
and the trial judge intends to sentence the defendant to a single day in jail
if convicted, then he or she does have a right to counsel.
Under the Court’s current interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
these are legally permissible results which call into question the wisdom of limiting the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to criminal cases where actual incarceration results.
III. CHANGES IN OUR CRIMINAL SYSTEM
Whatever validity the Court’s decisions in Argersinger and Scott may have had
at the time, changes to our criminal justice system over the past forty years call into
serious doubt the continued practice of limiting the right to counsel to cases that result
in actual incarceration.
A. Plea Bargaining
While the actual incarceration standard for the assignment of counsel adopted by
the Court in Argersinger and Scott is problematic, it becomes more so when we con-
sider that the rule presumes that most cases will be resolved by a trial. Following a trial
in which a defendant is convicted, it is the judge who has discretion in sentencing.177
The Court’s intention in Argersinger is clear: “Under the rule we announce today,
every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment
may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented
by counsel.”178
176 A similar situation is already taking place in many counties in Virginia. See Jeremy
Borden, Immigrants Take Guilty Pleas Without Lawyers and Can Later Be Deported, WASH.
POST (Jan. 27, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-27/local/36583601_1_illegal
-immigrants-guilty-plea-jail-time.
177 See, e.g., Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences
of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals,
86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 624 n.1 (2006).
178 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40.
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While recognizing the problems inherent in the Court’s limitation of the right to
counsel in Argersinger, the decision reflects the Court’s perception of our criminal
justice system as one where the primary method for resolving criminal cases is through
the trial process.179 The Court makes it clear “that absent a knowing and intelligent
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, mis-
demeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”180 If the major-
ity of cases are in fact being resolved through the trial process, then framing the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel as a trial right makes sense from a policy perspective. But
even if that were true at the time, trials are now the exception and not the rule in our
criminal justice system.181
The fact that our criminal justice system is dominated by plea bargaining has
been the reality for quite some time, but the Court’s recent recognition of this fact is
significant when we consider how that recognition impacts the right to counsel during
every critical stage of the proceedings. Though plea bargaining had been acknowl-
edged by the Court as a “critical stage” of the proceedings well before Padilla, Frye,
and Lafler were decided,182 the Court’s recognition of the dominance of plea bargain-
ing means that plea bargaining is not simply one of many critical stages; it is the only
critical stage.183
Because the assistance of counsel is necessary to navigate the increasingly complex
plea-bargaining process, it makes no sense to tie the right to counsel to a specific result
that is contingent upon the plea-bargaining process itself. Whether the defendant will
actually be incarcerated is often entirely dependent upon the effectiveness of counsel’s
representation during the plea-bargaining process. The continued use of a posttrial in-
carceration standard for the assignment of counsel in a pretrial determinative criminal
justice system makes little sense.
179 See Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to Padilla
v. Kentucky, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2010 at 21, 25 (“Gideon was . . . decided at a time when criminal
jury trials were regarded as the norm in the American justice system . . .”); see also Stephanos
Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
180 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37.
181 In Argersinger, the Court noted the problems associated with “assembly-line justice,”
and those problems have persisted. 407 U.S. at 34–37; see ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN,
NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. ATTORNEYS, THREE MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE
IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2011) [hereinafter THREE MINUTE JUSTICE]; see also
Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal
Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 307 (2011).
182 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52 (1985), and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), as examples of how the Court
has “long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for
purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel”).
183 See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 698 (2002) (“The most important ser-
vice that criminal defense lawyers perform for their clients is not dramatic cross-examination
of prosecution witnesses or persuasive closing arguments to the jury; it is advising clients
whether to plead guilty and on what terms.”).
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B. The Rise of Enmeshed Penalties
The Court’s reasoning in Argersinger and Scott needs to be viewed against the
backdrop of a criminal justice system which, at the time, imposed three distinct pen-
alties: incarceration, fines, or probation. The Court in Scott concluded that the “central
premise of Argersinger” was that imprisonment is different than fines or the threat
of imprisonment, thus revealing that the Court was only considering those specific three
punishments.184 Our modern criminal justice system has a wide range of enmeshed
penalties that result from a criminal conviction.185
The Court’s decisions in Argersinger and Scott offer little justification for singling
out incarceration as the only penalty which triggers the right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment except to note that it “is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere
threat of imprisonment.”186 As Justice Powell noted in his concurrence, the majority’s
reason “for extending the right to counsel to all cases in which the penalty of any
imprisonment is imposed applies equally well to cases in which other penalties may
be imposed.”187
Making incarceration the touchstone for the appointment of counsel would make
sense if a criminal conviction were typically followed by a sentence of incarceration.
If a minor or petty offense were only punished with a fine, and more serious “crimi-
nal” conduct were punished by incarceration, then equating the right to counsel in all
“criminal” prosecutions with the right to counsel in all cases where a defendant is
incarcerated is reasonable. But forty years after Argersinger, we now have a criminal-
justice system in which most people convicted of “crimes” are not sentenced to periods
of incarceration.188 The range of punishments has expanded dramatically.
The rise of “collateral consequences” has been well documented over the past sev-
eral decades.189 States have increasingly turned to nominally civil sanctions to punish
people convicted of crimes.190 The Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla establishes that
the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel applies to penalties
which are severe, intimately related to a criminal conviction, and which occur auto-
matically as a result of that conviction.191 The question still remains as to what other
184 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979).
185 See Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1791 (2012).
186 Scott, 440 U.S. at 373.
187 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 52 (1972).
188 See Chin, supra note 185, at 1804 (pointing out that “focusing . . . on ‘mass incarceration’
obscures the reality that most convicted persons are not sentenced to prison”).
189 See, e.g., JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER
REENTRY (2003); see also Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restric-
tions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 154 (1999).
190 See Demleitner, supra note 189, at 153–54.
191 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481–82 (2010).
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types of penalties can be viewed as serious enough to warrant extending the Court’s
rationale in Padilla.
At first glance, it would seem difficult to equate another type of penalty with de-
portation, something which the Court describes as “exile.”192 The difficulty is that
any one isolated consequence of conviction, such as the loss of voting rights193 or
access to public housing, may not be “severe” enough to warrant the extension of the
right to counsel. But these types of enmeshed penalties cannot be viewed in isolation.
On the contrary, they must be viewed in their entirety when assessing their severity
for purposes of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. A specific denial
of a benefit or a curtailment of a right may not rise to the level of punishment, but
a system of disabilities would constitute a type of severe punishment analogous to
deportation.194 It would be a mistake to look at a specific consequence of a conviction;
instead, we must view all of the potential consequences of a conviction as a web of
enmeshed penalties.195
The penalty at issue in Padilla, deportation, was of sufficient magnitude in and of
itself to trigger the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.196 But there are many
lesser penalties which result from a criminal conviction which, taken together, consti-
tute a system of punishment. These alternative systems of punishment, which are de-
fined elsewhere than in a state’s criminal code, cannot credibly be seen as anything
other than intimately related to the state’s system of punishment.197
192 Id. at 1486 (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1947)).
193 See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES
OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010 1 (2012),  available at http://
www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_State_Level_Estimates_of_Felon_Disen
_2010.pdf (estimating that one in forty adults “is disenfranchised due to a current or previous
felony conviction”).
194 See Chin, supra note 185, at 1790 (“[A] new ‘civil death’ is meted out to persons con-
victed of crimes in the form of a substantial and permanent change in legal status, operation-
alized by a network of collateral consequences.”).
195 In evaluating whether the warrantless use of a GPS tracking device by law enforcement
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, courts have looked at the overall impact
of GPS monitoring. What has been described as the “mosaic theory” takes into consideration
that although an officer could have observed a portion of a defendant’s movements over a
period of time, he or she would have been unable, without the use of a GPS tracking device,
to have knowledge of all of the defendant’s movements. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d
544, 558, 566–67 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In requiring a warrant for the use of GPS tracking devices,
courts have recognized that the “whole reveals more—sometimes a great deal more—than does
the sum of its parts.” Id. at 566–67; see also People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199–1200,
1202 (N.Y. 2009).
196 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481–82.
197 See Chin & Love, supra note 179, at 22 (“Modern criminal convictions do much more
than send people to prison and impose fines pursuant to court order. Convictions are the basis
for scores or hundreds of additional state and federal consequences, automatically imposed or
potentially made available by statute or regulation.”).
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It is important to emphasize that what is at issue is not a societal reaction to a con-
viction, but rather state-imposed barriers to the exercise of certain rights or privileges
as a result of a conviction. This is not a case of a business deciding not to hire some-
one who has previously been convicted of theft, but instead a legal impediment to
employment created by the state. The same legislature that has written the minimum
and maximum sentence for an offense in the criminal code has also written the various
laws that bar a person convicted from employment, housing, and education.
Identifying the wide range of enmeshed penalties that result from a criminal con-
viction is a daunting task. Because these penalties are scattered throughout various
statutes and administrative rules, and because they seem to grow more numerous by the
day, identifying all of the penalties associated with a criminal conviction is a chal-
lenge. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, which address “Collateral Sanctions,”
recommend collecting all of a jurisdiction’s collateral sanctions within the criminal
code and note that one of the problems with including collateral sanctions in the sen-
tencing process is that they are not easy to identify.198 In conjunction with the National
Institute of Justice, the ABA Criminal Justice Section is currently working on collect-
ing and analyzing data regarding the collateral consequences of conviction in every
jurisdiction in the United States.199 The National Inventory of Collateral Consequences
of Conviction now contains information on all the collateral consequences of a con-
viction in seventeen states.200
The systemic nature of these penalties becomes obvious once a list of them is
compiled. To illustrate this point, The Consequences of Criminal Proceedings in New
York State, produced by The Bronx Defenders, identifies the following areas in which
there are enmeshed penalties: “immigration”; “employment”; “housing,” including
“public housing”; “public benefits”; “family law”; “drivers licenses”; “forfeitures”;
“civic participation”; and additional consequences, including “liability in related civil
cases.”201 There are over one hundred licenses for various occupations in New York
that can be revoked as the result of a criminal conviction.202 Even a conviction for a
violation or an infraction, neither of which is considered a criminal offense in New
198 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS 21 (3d ed. 2004) (“Collateral sanctions have been
promulgated with little coordination in disparate sections of state and federal codes, making it
difficult to determine all of the penalties and disabilities applicable to a particular offense.”).
199 ABA & NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INVENTORY OF THE COLLATERAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF CONVICTION PROJECT DESCRIPTION, http://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/sentencing
/aba/abacollateralconsequences-description.pdf.
200 ABA & NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INVENTORY OF THE COLLATERAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF CONVICTION, available at http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/Collateral
Consequences/map.jsp (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
201 See THE BRONX DEFENDERS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN NEW
YORK STATE: A GUIDE FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS AND OTHER ADVOCATES FOR
PERSONS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS (2010), http://www.reentry.net/ny/search/item.76898.
202 Id. at 6.
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York, renders a person ineligible for public housing managed by the New York City
Public Housing Authority for a period of two years.203
In Ohio, a felony conviction can lead to the denial of licenses or license revoca-
tions for the following professions:
[A]ccountants, architects, athletic trainers, audiologists, barbers,
motor vehicle dealers, chiropractors, counselors, credit service or-
ganizations, dentists and dental hygienists, dietitians, emergency
medical service workers, engineers and surveyors, fireworks ex-
hibitors, hearing aid dealers, horse race workers, insurance admin-
istrators, insurance agents, livestock brokers/dealers, liquor license,
lottery sales agents, therapists, salvage dealers, nurses, occupational
therapists, opticians, optometrists, pharmacists, physical therapists,
physicians, physician assistants, precious metal dealers, private in-
vestigators, real estate appraisers, real estate brokers, respiratory
care professionals, school employees, security guards, social work-
ers, speech pathologists, telephone solicitors, and veterinarians.204
A survey of statutory “collateral consequences” in Kentucky identifies adverse conse-
quences in the following areas: “civil rights”; “civil liberties”; “parental rights”; “public
offices and officials”; “professional and occupational licenses”; “employment and em-
ployment benefits”; “applications and disclosures”; “licenses and permits”; “penalty
enhancements”; “sex offender registration”; “contractual relations”; and, lastly, “dis-
qualification as heir or beneficiary.”205
In Minnesota, there has been a legislative effort to identify all of the state’s
“collateral sanctions.”206 Chapter 609B of Minnesota Statutes Annotated lists the fol-
lowing twenty-two categories of “collateral sanctions”: employment and licensing;
teaching; health care licenses; transportation; elections; carriers; miscellaneous li-
censing provisions; liquor; gambling; fiduciary service and public office vacancies;
local government; metropolitan area officers and peace officers; driving and motor
vehicles; prison program eligibility; offender registration; crimes against a person;
203 Id. This serves as a particularly powerful illustration of the difficulty in codifying the
penalties that result from a conviction because the offense in this instance is not even clas-
sified as “criminal,” and the penalty is authorized by a city agency.
204 Marlaina Freisthler & Mark A. Godsey, Going Home to Stay: A Review of Collateral
Consequences of Conviction, Post-Incarceration Employment, and Recidivism in Ohio, 36
U. TOL. L. REV. 525, 536–37 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
205 Troy B. Daniels et al., Kentucky’s Statutory Collateral Consequences Arising from
Felony Convictions: A Practitioner’s Guide, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 413 (2008).
206 A “collateral sanction” is defined as “a legal penalty, disability, or disadvantage, however
denominated, that is imposed on a person automatically when that person is convicted of or
found to have committed a crime, even if the sanction is not included in the sentence.” MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609B.050 (West 2005).
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crimes of violence; possession of firearms, explosives, and similar devices; services
and benefits; property rights; civil rights and remedies; recreational activities; and game
and fish laws.207 It is difficult to see how a legal “penalty” that is “automatically” im-
posed as the result of a criminal conviction can credibly be defined as “collateral.”
Perhaps even more troubling is this caveat that follows the twenty-two categories of
collateral sanctions: “[T]he list of collateral sanctions laws contained in this chapter
is intended to be comprehensive but is not necessarily complete.”208 It appears that
states like Minnesota are incapable of keeping track of all the supposedly “collateral
consequences” that they impose on their citizens as a result of a criminal conviction.
In many ways, the nominally civil penalties that result from a criminal conviction
are an even more integral part of the criminal-justice system than the penalty at issue
in Padilla, deportation. Immigration law may at times be intimately connected to crim-
inal law, but at least it exists independently of it. The other types of penalties asso-
ciated with criminal convictions are often unique and have no corollary in any other
body of law.
Three factors led the Court to conclude that deportation was an enmeshed penalty
in Padilla: (1) the severity of the penalty; (2) that it was intimately related to the crim-
inal process; and (3) that it was imposed automatically for certain convictions.209 The
second and third prongs of the enmeshed penalty test announced by the Court in Padilla
are the easiest to satisfy. There is a wide range of penalties that are applied automati-
cally and as a direct result of a criminal conviction. The more difficult argument is that
those penalties are of the same severity as deportation. The mistake, however, would
be to view these penalties in isolation. Admittedly, the denial of public benefits may not
be equatable to “exile,” but a single conviction triggers not one but potentially dozens
of additional penalties. In a very real sense, states have established systems designed
to make people who have been convicted of crimes second class citizens.210
C. The Availability and Dissemination of Criminal Records
The availability and dissemination of criminal records has grown exponentially
since the Court’s decision in Argersinger. In our digital age, where information is
readily accessible, the use of criminal records to exclude people from employment,
housing, and education has become commonplace.211 Incarceration for a brief time,
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480–87 (2010).
210 See generally Chin, supra note 185, at 1790 (“[A] new ‘civil death’ is meted out to
persons convicted of crimes in the form of a substantial and permanent change in legal status,
operationalized by a network of collateral consequences.”).
211 See Douglas Belkin, More Job Seekers Scramble to Erase Their Criminal Past, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 11, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125789494126242343.html; CTR. FOR CMTY.
ALTS., RECONSIDERED: THE USE OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS
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while certainly unpleasant, pales in comparison to the life-altering consequences of
a criminal conviction.
The Supreme Court was not oblivious to the far-reaching consequences of a crim-
inal conviction when it decided Argersinger.212 However, the Court assumed that those
consequences were related to incarceration. The Court noted that “the prospect of im-
prisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial
or ‘petty’ matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career
and his reputation.”213 It was incarceration, and not necessarily conviction, that was
considered problematic in the Court’s opinion.214 However, the potential for the con-
viction itself to be at least as damaging as incarceration, if not more so, was recognized
by Judge Powell in his concurring opinion and is obvious today.215
Over the last forty years, technological advances have dramatically increased
the availability of criminal records to both law enforcement and the general public.
Criminal records have become, in the words of professor James Jacobs, “a negative
curriculum vitae . . . used to determine eligibility for occupational licenses, social wel-
fare benefits, employment, and housing.”216 The advent of digital record keeping, com-
bined with computer technology, the internet, and now the smart phone literally puts
criminal records in the palm of one’s hand. A decade ago, background checks tended
to be cursory or expensive, but now database providers can quickly access information
from any of the country’s 3,100 court jurisdictions and charge ten dollars or less for
basic background checks.217 When Argersinger was decided, if a person had been con-
victed of a crime and wanted to put the past behind him, all he had to do was move.218
(2010), available at http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdf/Reconsidered-criminal-hist
-recs-in-college-admissions.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO SECOND CHANCE: PEOPLE WITH
CRIMINAL RECORDS DENIED ACCESS TO PUBLIC HOUSING (2004), available at http://www.hrw
.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1104.pdf.
212 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 55 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
213 Id. at 37 (citing Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970)).
214 Id. at 36–37.
215 Id. at 47–48 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The consequences of a misdemeanor conviction,
whether they be a brief period served under the sometimes deplorable conditions found in
local jails or the effect of a criminal record on employability, are frequently of sufficient
magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label ‘petty.’ Serious consequences also may
result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment . . . Losing one’s driver’s license is
more serious for some individuals than a brief stay in jail.” (footnote omitted)).
216 James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal
Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 177 (2008) (footnote omitted); see also James
B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 387, 420 (2006).
217 Belkin, supra note 211, at 3.
218 Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 216, at 211 (“Before the advent of these criminal records
systems, individuals may have escaped their criminal past and begun new life in a different
town, city, or state. In effect, the information technology revolution and the criminal records
systems and databases that it has spawned return society to a kind of small town life where
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Now, a criminal record follows a person for the rest of his life no matter where he goes.
The Society for Human Resource Management conducted a survey of employers on the
impact of criminal background checks.219 The 2010 survey, Background Checking:
Conducting Criminal Background Checks, revealed that seventy-three percent of
employers conduct criminal background checks on all of their employees, with an-
other nineteen percent conducting checks on selected employees.220 When asked about
the impact of a non-violent, misdemeanor conviction, defined as an offense punish-
able by a fine, a term of imprisonment of up to a year, or both, fifty-one percent of
employers said that it would be “somewhat influential” on their decision not to hire
the job applicant, with an additional twenty-two percent responding that it would be
“very influential.”221 Criminal records have become a form of electronic branding.222
The Court’s reasoning in Argersinger and Scott is that, by not imposing incar-
ceration as a punishment, the offense is effectively decriminalized. At one time, this
approach may have seemed like a reasonable exercise of judicial discretion in cases
where the legislature had not mandated incarceration as a penalty upon conviction.
In Argersinger, the Court quoted the ABA’s Project on Standards for Criminal Justice,
which endorsed disregarding the characterization of an offense as a felony, misde-
meanor, or traffic infraction “[a]s a matter of sound judicial administration” and instead
drawing “a categorical line at those types of offenses for which incarceration as a pun-
ishment is a practical possibility.”223 While certainly a practical recommendation at
the time it was made, the decision to not impose a sentence of incarceration no longer
“decriminalizes” an offense.224 Incarceration, even for a brief period of time, undoubt-
edly has the potential to cause the temporary loss of employment and housing, but
practically everyone knows or has access to everyone else’s personal history, especially their
contact with the criminal justice system.”).
219 SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING: CONDUCTING CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECKS (2010), available at http://www.shrm.org/research/surveyfindings
/articles/pages/backgroundcheckcriminalchecks.aspx.
220 Id. at 3.
221 Id. at 5.
222 There was a time when corporal punishments that sought to shame an offender were
common, but as the nation grew, increased mobility limited the effectiveness of these forms
of punishments. See Developments in the Law: Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1863, 1870–73 (1998).
223 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 39 (1972) (quoting ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 40 (app. draft 1968)).
224 The National Legal Aid & Defender Association’s Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems
in the United States recommends making counsel available “[i]n any governmental fact-finding
proceeding, the purpose of which is to establish the culpability or status of such persons, which
might result in the loss of liberty or in a legal disability of a criminal or punitive nature.” NAT’L
LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (1976), available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Guidelines
_For_Legal_Defense_Systems. Neither the categorization of the charges or the potential for
incarceration is determinative of the right to counsel. Id.
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a conviction, even without the penalty of incarceration, can result in the permanent
loss of employment and housing.
IV. ADVOCATING FOR THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL BASED ON ENMESHED PENALTIES
The recognition in Padilla that certain types of enmeshed penalties implicate the
right to counsel, coupled with the acknowledgment in Lafler and Frye that our criminal-
justice system has made plea bargaining the most critical stage of the proceeding,
undermines the holdings of Argersinger and Scott. The time has come to acknowl-
edge another obvious truth: It is not always the sentence the court will impose that is
to be feared, it is the conviction itself.
The Court’s extension of procedural protections to criminal defendants over the
last fifty years may have had the unintended consequence of encouraging overcrim-
inalization and more severe sentencing schemes.225 States have found another way to
punish those convicted of crimes. It is no longer necessary to resort to jail, fines, or
probation when the conviction itself will render a person unemployable or homeless.
The Court’s deference to legislative categorization of offenses has allowed states to
create nominally civil proceedings that inflict punishment just as effectively, but far
more efficiently, than criminal prosecutions.226
The web of enmeshed penalties that ensnare people who are convicted of crimes
is further evidence of our criminal justice system’s abandonment of the rehabilitative
ideal.227 The enmeshed penalties associated with conviction serve little, if any, rehabil-
itative purpose.228 What we now have are systems designed solely to punish. In some
ways, the enmeshed penalties of a criminal conviction are worse than a temporary loss
of liberty through incarceration because many of them are permanent. It is important
to note that the imposition of these types of enmeshed penalties is a policy decision
made legislatively. If states wish to impose enmeshed penalties on people convicted
225 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505 (2001); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure
and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997) (discussing the unappreciated costs of consti-
tutional criminal procedure).
226 See generally Coffee, supra note 27 (arguing that the “blurring of the border” between
civil and criminal law results in injustice); John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring
of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—And What Can be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875
(1992) (discussing the expansion of criminal law into the field of civil law); Markus D. Dubber,
Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509 (2004) (observ-
ing that our nation’s criminal law has been transformed into a system of risk administration);
Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an Offense, 88 CAL. L. REV. 335 (2000)
(noting that surprisingly little effort has been devoted to the question of what is a crime).
227 See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting
Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 478 (2010).
228 See Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption,
and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J. 753, 792 (2011).
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of crimes, then they are free to do so, but the Constitution requires that they pay a
procedural price, a price they can avoid paying because the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel is limited to cases of actual incarceration.
There is no question that our nation’s indigent-defense systems are in crisis.229
There are some who have advocated not for an expansion of the right to counsel, but
rather for further limitations on that right.230 The argument that counsel should be pro-
vided in any case where a conviction might subject someone to nominally civil penal-
ties would only create more work for assigned counsel systems, which are incapable
of meeting the current demand for legal services.231
While it is true that states have failed to adequately fund indigent-defense systems,
there is every reason to believe that the additional pressure placed on those systems by
expanding the right to counsel could lead to systemic reform. The actual incarceration
standard allows states a Sixth Amendment loophole. The rule in Argersinger and Scott
effectively rewrote the Sixth Amendment. Instead of a right to counsel in all criminal
prosecutions, the Court declared that there is only a right to counsel in a prosecution
that actually results in incarceration. The Court’s designation of incarceration as the
only punishment that implicates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has allowed
alternative systems of punishment to flourish.
CONCLUSION
The simplest way to illustrate that a criminal conviction is far more damaging than
a day in jail is through the following hypothetical:
You are charged with the misdemeanor of driving with a sus-
pended license and are offered a plea bargain by the prosecutor:
plea to a violation, what is considered a non-criminal offense,
one that will not give you a criminal record, and spend a night in
jail. The judge tells you that if you would prefer to simply plead
229 See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING
NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 2 (2009), available at http://www
.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. ATTORNEYS,
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR
COURTS 7 (2009), available at http://www.nacdl.org/reports; THREE MINUTE JUSTICE, supra
note 181, at 11.
230 See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding
and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967 (2012) (arguing that the right to counsel
should not be expanded to the civil context); Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor
Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461 (2007) (arguing that empirical evidence suggests
that counsel in misdemeanor cases do not typically provide significant benefits to their clients).
231 This reality actually creates a perverse incentive for the attorneys who provide indigent
defense services to not assert a defendant’s right to counsel in cases other than those that result
in actual incarceration. Hashimoto, supra note 230, at 478.
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guilty to the charge, the sentence imposed would be a fine of
fifty dollars but reminds you that you would be pleading guilty
to a misdemeanor, a crime. Assuming that you are in fact guilty of
the charge and would be convicted at trial, would you accept the
prosecutor’s offer?
No reasonable person would choose to have a criminal record for the rest of his
life when he could avoid it by spending a single night in jail. The Court has recog-
nized that defendants need counsel to avoid the enmeshed penalties of conviction,
and it has acknowledged the fact that our criminal-justice system is a system of plea
bargaining. The time has come for the Court to accept the fact that convictions some-
times matter more than incarceration and to extend the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to criminal prosecutions where the conviction itself will subject a defendant
to a web of enmeshed penalties.
